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FOREWORD: A SILK PURSE? 
John T. Noonan, Jr.* 
On March 2, 1801, President John Adams appointed forty-two per­
sons to be justices of the peace in the District of Columbia.1 John 
Marshall, doubling as Secretary of State as well as Chief Justice, failed 
to deliver the commissions. Adams's term expired. James Madison, 
Marshall's successor as Secretary of State, withheld seventeen of the 
commissions. In 1802, William Marbury and three other appointees to 
this minor office brought mandamus against Madison in the Supreme 
Court.2 Madison was ordered to show cause why the writ should not 
issue. Congress abolished the June sitting of the Court. Only in 1803 
was the case argued. 
In an opinion famous for its brilliance and its bluntness, Chief 
Justice Marshall wrote: "It is emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department, to say what the law is."3 And he went on to 
say that if the law and the Constitution are in conflict, "the court must 
determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of 
the very essence of judicial duty."4 The conflict was resolved by the 
justices' oath to uphold the Constitution.5 On that premise, Marshall 
held the Judiciary Act of 1789, authorizing the Supreme Court to issue 
writs of mandamus, violated Article III of the Constitution and was 
therefore void.6 The court was without jurisdiction to hear Marbury's 
suit. The icing on the cake - John Marshall's special brand of icing7 
- was that the side that hated his principle, Madison's side, could not 
appeal his conclusion because it had won the case. 
A silk purse out of a saw's ear? The case arose from a failure in 
Marshall's duty as Secretary of State, a failure for which he feared 
"some blame may be imputed to me."8 The decision held unconstitu-
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; Chair in American Law 
and Government at the Kluge Center for Scholars at the Library of Congress. - Ed. 
1. 3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 110 (Houghton Mifflin 
1929) (1919). 
2. Id. at 111. 
3. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
4. Id. at 177-78. 
5. Id. at 180. 
6. Id. at 173. 
7. Cf Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
8. 3 BEVERIDGE, supra note 1, at 124 (quoting Marshall to his brother James M. Mar­
shall, March 18, 1801 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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tional a provision of the Judiciary Act passed by a Congress domi­
nated by Federalists and containing at least thirteen Framers of the 
Constitution.9 The decision invalidated a provision already used by the 
Court without question to decide a case.10 The decision held the Court 
to be without jurisdiction to hear the suit, so what more could the 
Court say than that it lacked jurisdiction?11 The general statement of 
the Court's duty to void unconstitutional statutes must have been 
dictum going far beyond the immediate issue. The dictum emerged 
against a political background in which the Jeffersonian Republicans, 
triumphant in the election of 1800, had announced plans to tame the 
antidemocratic rule of the Federalist judiciary; Marshall felt the need 
to confront the political challenge.12 All of these aspects of Marbury 
are what made it a political can of worms or the proverbial sow's ear. 
Precedent for a court invalidating legislation existed in the practice of 
the highest court of Virginia.13 Still, what nation had a court 
monitoring all its laws? The power of the court to interpret law was 
itself a great power. "Its interpretation makes the law," as an old 
maxim of the canonists puts it.14 To go beyond interpretation to 
nullification was a quantum jump. But out of a bureaucratic bungle, a 
surprise attack on a statute enacted by the First Congress, and a 
disavowal of jurisdiction emerged an invention dazzling in its reach, 
supported by reasoning whose cogency seems undeniable. Marbury v. 
Madison, whose 200th anniversary we commemorate this weekend, 
does look like the proverbial silk purse. 
It is my purpose tonight to put before you what Marbury has 
spawned and ask if it is a purse to be prized. First, some vital statistics. 
Since 1803, there have been 156 cases in which the Supreme Court has 
held acts of Congress unconstitutional.15 This number is modest in 
comparison with the 1,150 cases holding state laws unconstitutional.16 
Of the 156 federal cases, ten have involved the District of Columbia, 
which was treated as a state might have been,17 so that only 146 cases 
have involved the exercise of truly national power by Congress. The 
9. Id. at 129. 
10. United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42 (1795). 
11. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
12. 3 BEVERIDGE, supra note 1, at 131. 
13. Cases of the Judges, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135 (1788); Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 
Call) 5 (1782). 
14. JOHANNES TEUTONICUS, GLOSSA ORDINARIA ON COMPJLATIO TERTIA 5.23.6, at 
intelligere vo/11m11s. 
15. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND 
INTERPRETATION 999-1031 (Johnny H. Killian et al. eds., 1997). 
16. Id. at 2035-491 (The number of cases is as of 2000). 
17. Id. 
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number of invalidations has been rising - only one from 1803 to 1866; 
only twenty-six for the entire nineteenth century; the remaining 120 
from 1900 through 2002, with thirty-seven since 1986 by the Rehnquist 
Court.18 If judicial activism means preferring judges' view of the 
constitutionality of legislation to that of legislators, this court has been 
the most judicially active court in our history. 
I turn from statistics and trends to a different kind of question. Has 
John Marshall's invention been exercised for good, for bad, or for re­
sults that either did not matter or could have been reached by a 
different route? 
By "a different route," I mean on the basis of a principle that did 
not make the Supreme Court supreme over the two other coordinate 
branches of the federal government on most questions of what the 
Constitution means. To illustrate what I mean, the Court in Marbury 
could have held that the judicial power was peculiarly within the com­
petence of the judiciary, so that the Supreme Court alone had power 
to decide what jurisdiction Congress correctly conferred upon it. The 
assertion of the power to protect one's own turf, as it were, would not 
necessarily imply a power to judge all acts of Congress. 
It may be objected, How can constitutional review be so arbitrarily 
limited to Article III questions? The answer is that, as the power has 
been invented without any express constitutional basis, it may be 
limited as seems prudent to the Court. One can as easily ask, Why 
does the Court not extend its power to decide constitutional disputes 
within Congress or involving foreign affairs or bearing on actions by 
the military? Logically, there is no reason for the Court to shirk its 
constitutional task in these areas. The Supreme Court of Israel does 
not.19 Just as prudence keeps our Supreme Court out of such matters, 
so judicial restraint could limit it to Article III questions. 
If the Court took upon itself only the interpretation of Article III 
of the Constitution, it could have invalidated a number of the acts it 
did invalidate and could have done so without asserting a general su­
premacy over Congress. Article III is explicit: "The judicial Power of 
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court . . . .  "20 This 
grant of power is broad enough to confer upon the Court the power to 
rebuff all congressional intrusions upon it and to regulate all congres­
sional variations of it. For example, the five cases of the 1950s and 
1960s invalidating the extension of the jurisdiction of military tribunals 
over civilians could all be decided as congressional invasions of Article 
18. Id. 
19. Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a 
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 98-100 (2002). 
20. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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III.21 The twenty-four cases invalidating congressional regulation of 
civilian trials also fall within the scope of Article III.22 So, for example, 
the Supreme Court could have decided the application of the Seventh ' 
Amendment in 1869 in Justices v. Murray23 to prevent retrial after a 
jury acquittal in federal court; so in 1965, it could have decided United 
States v. Romano24 by holding invalid the presumption of guilt from 
presence at the scene of a crime; and so in 1969, it could have decided 
Leary v. United States25 by invalidating the presumption of knowledge 
that drugs are imported. Other examples are Wong Wing v. United 
States26 in 1896, which invalidated summary criminal proceedings out 
of court; Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline 
Co. 27 in 1982, holding that bankruptcy judges cannot exercise the 
powers of Article III judges; and Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, lnc.28 in 
1995, deciding that the Securities and Exchange Commission could not 
be given the power to reopen a judgment of a federal court.29 
The list could be extended; there are at least fifteen more such 
cases. The examples suggest how effective Article III alone, or used in 
conjunction with other constitutional provisions, would be in preserv­
ing the integrity of the judicial branch. Indeed, when the courts are re­
garded as the repository of Article III power, and that alone, the use 
of the courts to appoint federal defenders and bankruptcy judges and 
the use of the courts to decide extradition cases raise constitutional 
questions worthy of examination.30 
The one area where I would think judges cannot use Article III 
or any other basis to protect themselves is that involving their own 
salaries. A judge who has a financial interest in a case is no longer a 
judge.31 Necessity cannot remove incapacitating interest and make him 
21. See Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. 
Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 
(1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11  
(1955). 
22. See, e.g., Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 
U.S. 39 (1968); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899). 
23. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274 (1869). 
24. 382 U.S. 136 (1965). 
25. 395 U.S. 6 (1969). 
26. 163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
27. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
28. 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
29. See Plaw, 514 U.S. at 211; N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 50; Wong Wing, 163 
U.S. at 228. 
30. The appointment of attorneys and other judges is not an exercise of judicial power. 
In extradition cases it may be argued that the courts are only advising the Executive Branch. 
See LoBue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65 (0.0.C. 1995), vacated by 82 F.3d 1081 (O.C. Cir. 
1996). 
31. See, e.g., Hall v. Thayer, 105 Mass. 219 (1870). 
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or her impartial. United States v. Wi/!32 in 1980 was decided ignoring 
this principle, and there are other examples.33 
Now let's look at cases where, at least in the long run, the 
employment of John Marshall's wonderful invention didn't make 
much difference. In this category, I put, argumentatively, the cases in­
volving the respective powers of Congress and the President. To take 
two notable examples, in Myers v. United States34 in 1926, the Court, 
under Chief Justice Taft (an ex-president), held that Congress could 
not restrict the president's power to remove appointees of the presi­
dent.35 In 1998, in Clinton v. City of New York, the Court held that the 
President could not be given a line item veto over an appropriation.36 
In the short run, no doubt, each decision was significant. But in the 
long run, power flows back and forth from the executive branch to the 
legislative branch, and vice versa. Imbalances tend to right themselves. 
Is a benevolent umpire really needed? One may inquire whether what 
Learned Hand called "a bevy of Platonic Guardians" was necessary in 
the ten cases in this category.37 
Another type of case is where the immediate decision did not 
make much difference, and any principle established could have been 
established in a more significant case or was already known. In this 
category fall United States v. Dewitt38 in 1869, holding that Congress 
could not regulate the sale of naptha; In re Heff9 in 1905, holding that 
Congress could not prohibit liquor sales to Native Americans, a deci­
sion overruled eleven years later; and Coyle v. Smith40 in 1911, declar­
ing invalid a provision in the act admitting Oklahoma as a state that 
fixed the location of the state capital for three years in Guthrie. Not 
entirely trivial but wasteful of time and legislative energy are cases like 
the Trade-Mark Cases41 of 1879, holding that Congress had no power 
under the Patents and Copyright Clause to protect trademarks. Of 
course in 1881, Congress exercised its power under the Commerce 
Clause to do that very thing.42 
32. 449 U.S. 200 (1980). 
33. See United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001); Booth v. United States, 291 U.S. 
339 (1934); Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920). 
34. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
35. Myers, 272 U.S. at 52. 
36. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
37. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958). 
38. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1869). 
39. 197 U.S. 488 (1905), o verruled by United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916). 
40. 221 U.S. 559 (1911). 
41. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
42. See Trademark Act of 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502 (1881 ). 
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Value judgments, no doubt, are involved in saying these cases 
didn't make much difference, and I have no doubt that my examples 
could be disputed or extended. I enter upon what is, perhaps, more 
perilous: to give examples where exercise of the Court's power was a 
serious mistake, bad for the country and not good for the Court. 
The most famous example is Dred Scott v. Sandford43 in 1856, a 
decision that not only voided the carefully worked out Missouri 
Compromise, but helped bring on the Civil War; a decision that not 
only prevented Congress from prohibiting slavery in the territories of 
the United States but held that no descendent of a slave could ever be 
a citizen of the United States; a decision that didn't even need decid­
ing because it was a fake case, made up by pro-slavery partisans who 
wanted the opinion of the pro-slavery Supreme Court.44 
Not quite in this rank category but bad enough are the decisions of 
1883 - United States v. Harris,45 voiding the post-Civil War law 
against conspiracy to lynch African Americans, and The Civil Rights 
Cases,46 voiding the law on discrimination against them in hotels and 
restaurants. The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 are the operative precedent 
for United States v. Morrison47 in 1996, holding unconstitutional the 
federal civil remedy provided in the Violence Against Women Act of 
September 13, 1994. 
Only slightly better in this hierarchy of the bad - I speak not as a 
judge but as an observer of popular opinion - is the case attempting 
to outlaw labor for more than eight hours a day or more than six days 
a week in manufacturing by children under the age of fourteen, 
Hammer v. Dagenhart48 in 1918, and the case of another federal law' 
attempting to tax similar exploitation of the young, Bailey v. Drexel 
Furniture Co. 49 in 1922. 
One can go a little higher to the whole batch of cases that consti­
tuted the assault by the Court on the New Deal - an assault mounted 
almost immediately after the passage of the legislation attacked. Here 
are A. L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States50 in 1935, denying 
Congress the power under the Commerce Clause to authorize codes of 
43. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
44. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Book Review, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 281-92 (reviewing DON 
E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS). 
45. 106 U.S. 629 (1883). 
46. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
47. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
48. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (also known as The Child Labor Case). 
49. 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (also known as The Child Labor Tax Case). 
50. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
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fair competition; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan51 in 1935, denying 
Congress the power to delegate power to the President to regulate oil 
production; United States v. Butler52 in 1936, holding the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act not to be within the tax power of Congress; and 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,53 a collusive suit, in which the Commerce 
Clause power was held not to embrace employer-employee relations 
in mining. These cases of the mid-1930s are particularly striking in 
presenting a deeply divided court, with the embattled majority intent 
upon what many saw as a political struggle with a popular president. 
I go from these cases to those of more recent vintage in which the 
Court has affirmed the immunity of the states from suits for damages 
for their violation of federal law. In particular, there are Alden v. 
Maine54 in 1999, affirming state immunity from damages under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act; the two College Savings Bank55 cases in 
1999, protecting state-sponsored insurance schemes from suit under 
the patent laws or under the trademark laws; Kimel v. Florida Board 
of Regents56 in 2000, denying recovery from a state under the 
Anti-Discrimination in Employment Act; and Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v. Garrett57 in 2001, preventing recovery from 
the state under the Americans with Disabilities Act. This batch of 
cases represents the reaffirmation of state sovereignty that was first 
asserted to be of constitutional dimensions in Hans v. Louisiana58 in 
1890. The cases also reflect the discovery of a new constitutional prin­
ciple that requires the federal judiciary to determine whether 
Congress, in legislating under the Fourteenth Amendment, has estab­
lished a record that shows a pattern of evil on a national scale and has 
then enacted a remedy congruent with and proportionate to the evil 
identified by the record.59 
After this chronicle of decisions ranging from the truly terrible to 
those where reasonable jurists might disagree as to the premises and 
the policies embraced, what about the good that has been achieved by 
John Marshall's mighty device for correcting error? It has worked 
spectacularly well in an area that could be deprecated as merely sym­
bolic. But we live by symbols, and the symbols are those celebrating 
51. 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
52. 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
53. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
54. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
55. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 
(1999). 
56. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
57. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
58. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
59. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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our basic freedoms of thought and speech. I refer in particular to 
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.60 in 1983, invalidating the 
nineteenth-century Comstock law prohibiting the use of the mails to 
send information about contraception; United States v. Eichman61 in 
1990, holding unconstitutional a law prohibiting desecration of the 
flag; and the Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez62 case of 2001, striking 
limits on the speech of lawyers employed by federally funded legal aid 
clinics. In each of these cases, I am certain that in the long run 
Americans will be grateful not only that we have a Supreme Court but 
that it is capable of restraining popular excesses. 
The Court's use of its power to invalidate campaign finance reform 
in 1976 in Buckley v. Valeo was controversial and still is,63 because it 
equated a limit with spending with a limit on speech; the concern over 
corruption that the legislation embodied seemed to be trumped by a 
metaphor. But in the three cases I have classified as symbolic - and 
there are others like them - the Supreme Court has been the stalwart 
defender of freedom. 
What is the balance? Is Marshall's machine worth celebrating and 
preserving? Has it cost too much in actual injury to the legislative pro­
cess and the common good? By my imperfect and controversial count, 
use of the general power of invalidation was unnecessary at least 
sixty-three times, harmful seventeen times, and necessary and benefi­
cial three times. If these figures are extrapolated to all 146 instances, it 
looks as though only seven times or five percent of the time has the 
power been truly useful. 
Is the power too deep in our democratic process as we understand 
it in America to be cut back in any way? It is plain that a survey of de­
cided cases does not reveal the number of times the existence of the 
power has operated as a restraint on legislative excesses that, because 
of its existence, are not enacted. Is it "a landmark in American history 
so high that all the future could take [its] bearings from it?"64 These 
are questions for you to investigate and to illuminate. 
60. 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
61. 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
62. 531 U.S.533 (2001). 
63. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
64. 3 BEVERIDGE, supra note 1, at 142. 
